Let T be a consistent r.e. extension of Peano arithmetic; 2¡¡, ILj the usual quantifier-block classification of formulas of the language of arithmetic (bounded quantifiers counting "for free"); and I\ F variables through the set of all classes 2¡¡, H°. The principal concern of this paper is the question: When can we find an independent sentence <j> G T which is r'-conservative in the following sense: Any sentence x m I" which is provable from T + <f> is already provable from T1 (Additional embellishments : Ensure that <f> is not provably equivalent to a sentence in any class "simpler" than T; that <f> is not conservative for classes "more complicated" than F.) The answer, roughly, is that one can find such a <j>, embellishments and all, unless T and F are so related that such a <f> obviously cannot exist. This theorem has applications to the theory of interpretations, since "<p is r-conservative" is closely related to the property "T + <J> is interpretable in 7"'-or to variants of it, depending on T. Finally, we provide simple model theoretic characterizations of Fconservativeness.
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D. GUASPARI will every independent sentence obtained by an "effectively inseparable sets" construction. So to produce an independent 2° sentence which is IT^-con requires, in some sense, another general construction for generating independent sentences.
Sentences which are II°-non make new truths provable. For example, one can produce a 2° sentence a such that arithmetic + a is consistent and proves n° sentences (truths) not provable in ZFC, while ZFC + a is inconsistent.
The existence of 2° sentences which are IIrcon can be equivalently stated: If T is a consistent r.e. extension of arithmetic, there are IT? truths unprovable in any consistent extension of T obtained by adding only 2° sentences. This is a limitation on provability in false extensions of (false) theories.
After this paper was essentially completed Smorynski called attention to the papers [Hajek, 1] , [Hajek, 2] , [Hajkova-Hajek] dealing with the closely related notion of interpretability: Say that <i> is interpretable in T if T + <f> is interpretable in T. For a broad class of theories "interpretable" is equivalent to "IT?,-con", and for such theories our methods immediately establish: There is a 2° sentence <j> which is interpretable in T (so, of course, relatively consistent with T) but whose relative consistency with T cannot be proven in, say, PA. (The point here is that <j> is so simple.)
The paper is organized as follows: §1 lays out various examples from nature (Con(r), -iCon(r), Rosser sentences) and shows that we will have to look elsewhere for inspiration in proving the main (obviously true) existence theorem. The heart of the paper is §2. It contains the basic existence theorems and some embellishments thereof. §3 compares the notions "IT°-con" with variants of the notion "interpretable."
Straightforward generalizations to larger languages and to an analogous theory for the Levy hierarchy of formulas of set theory are noted in §4. The syntactical part of the paper is concluded in §5 by mentioning some open questions, in particular, that of classifying {<j>\<¡> is r-con} in the arithmetical hierarchy. (Solovay has solved a particularly interesting special case originally proposed by Hajek.) §6 contains model theoretic characterizations of r-con. E.g., <¡> is 2°-con over PA (peano arithmetic) iff every countable model of PA contains an initial segment which models PA + </>. (II?-con can be characterized dually.) The proofs of these theorems are independent of the previous sections. All follow easily from theorems of Friedman which characterize the end extensions of countable models of arithmetic. For models of set theory one and only one new twist occurs. Fact: <f> is 11,-con ("II," refers to the Levy hierarchy) over ZF iff every countable non-u-model of ZF can be end extended to model ZF + <j>. An example shows that the qualification "non-w-model" cannot be dropped. dences and for generously allowing theorems of theirs to be included in this paper. Thanks are also due Tom McLaughlin who helped weed out some proofs of 0 = 1 from those of 0 = 0. 0. Notation and preliminaries. Every theory considered will be formulated in a language satisfying the following conditions: There is a special sort, the number sort, with u, v, . . ., z among the number variables. In addition to both unbounded quantifiers over each sort there are bounded quantifiers-Vx < y, 3w < z, etc.-over the number sort. Among the nonlogical signs are the signs of arithmetic-namely +, -, < , 0, '-applicable only to terms and variables of the number sort.
LA is the language made up from the signs of arithmetic, variables of the number sort, and quantification over the number sort. The theory N (see [Shoenfield, p. 22] ) is a finitely axiomatizable theory of recursive arithmetic. That is, TV decides (correctly) every sentence of LA containing no unbounded quantifiers. That fact is formalizable in P: (notation explained later in this section) for any sentence a in 2?, PA\-a ^ThmN(Ta1).
PA, Peano arithmetic, is N + induction for all formulas of LA.
Notice that ZF and GB, though not ordinarily expressed in languages that meet the requirements above, can easily be reformulated in languages that do so.
Convention. "Theory" means "consistent theory containing PA ". So, e.g., S is a subtheory of T means that PA Q S C T. This convention is too strong. In the sequel we can almost always get by on just the assumption that our theories contain N. Most of the time that part of the theory outside LA will be quite hazy and unimportant.
Define the 2°, 11° formulas of LA as usual: 2°, = IIo, = A° = the class of formulas containing no unbounded quantifiers; 2°+1 is the class of formulas Qxx with x in n°, Jc a sequence of number variables, and Q a possibly empty sequence of quantifiers not containing V. IIo,+1 is defined dually. Notice that in this way each class of formulas is literally a subset of any class of "ostensibly more complicated" formulas. Every 2°, formula is equivalent (in N) to a 'prenex' 2° formula: one with prefix a strictly alternating sequence of n unbounded quantifiers followed by a 'matrix' containing no unbounded quantifiers. For any theory T, T-2° is the class of formulas T provably equivalent to 2°, formulas; etc.; and T-A°" is r-2° n T-U°n. T, F, . . . will vary over the classes 2°, IIo ; and T-T, . . . over T-2°, etc. f" is the dual class to T: i.e., 2° = U°" and îl°n = 2°.
Definition 0.1. If <j>, 0 are formulas of form 3xx(x), 3xip(x) respectively, then <¡> < 9 =df 3x(x(x) A Vv < * -i*O0), r> < 9 =df 3x(x(x) A Vv < x^*(v)).
Notice that if <¡> and 9 are 'prenex' 2° formulas then so are (£ =< 9 and <j> <. 9. More generally, if <?> is 2° and x is T-A°n, then <J> =< 9 is T-20. Abuses of this notation will include writing <f><(-¡9) when, e.g., <f> is 2° and 0 is IIo.
Smorynski has pointed out an unfortunate defect in this notation-namely, that it suggests that <> =< <i> is true, which is not always the case.
Notice also that if <j> and 9 are 'prenex' 2° and either one of them is true, then <i> < 9 is decidable.
Formalizing syntax and semantics. We will use /', j, . . ., n metamathematically for natural numbers, and n for the canonical term denoting n. If k is the Gödel number of <j> (according to some fixed standard numbering) then T<j>1 is k. (So the Gödel number (from now on, "g.n.") of <¡> is a natural number, while r<i>1 is a term in LA.)
Procedures for obtaining partial truth definitions are well known. Fact 0.2 is stated primarily to establish notation.
Fact 0.2. For any T there is a formula </>(*) in T satisfying: For any sentence x G I\ PA Y <K Tx1 ) <-» x-Choose one such </> and call it r-True. If x is 3x$(x) we will use "v is a witness for x" to mean <j>(y). We want Proofr( y, x) to be a (simple) binumeration in T expressing: v codes a proof from T of (the formula with g.n.) x. That may not be possible-e.g., if T is r.e. but nonrecursive. However, if T is r.e. there is a recursive 7" equivalent to T and we can therefore take Proofr to be a PA -A0 binumeration (in PA) of: v codes a proof from 7" of x. Let Thm^x) be By Proof r(v, x) and Con(T) be -.Thm^ r0 = l1 ).
All conventions for denoting formalized operations on syntax are unsatisfactory. Here is another. Suppose we want to formalize a function which, inputing m and «-g.n.'s for <j> and 9 respectively-outputs a g.n. for <j> < 9. We add a defined function symbol, say g, which formalizes the function and agree to nótate gxy by: "jc < v". (The quotation marks are part of the notation.) So, e.g., N\-"r4>1 < r91 "= r<¡> < 91. Another example, of another function: W h" r91 -> rx"" " = r9 -* x1 • Finally, we will make extensive use of a well-known lemma of Gödel. Fact 0.3 (Self-reference lemma). If <j>(x) e T has only x free, a sentence X £ r can be effectively found for which p^thx^rx1)-1. Basic definitions and some examples. Definition 1.1. Let T be a theory, <j> a sentence, X any set of formulas in LA. Then, <t> is Z-con over T iff every sentence in X provable from T + </> is provable from T, <J> is Z-non over T iff <i> is not A'-con over T.
The next lemma has to go somewhere, so may as well go here. It characterizes r-con. Until referred to it is skippable. Lemma 1.2. Let T be an extension of N. Then:
(1) A 'prenex' IIo sentence </> is 2°-co« over T if and only if Va (a a 'prenex' 2° sentence and T h a => T h a < ( -i <£)).
(2) A 'prenex' 2° sentence <j> is Ii°-con over T if and only if Va (a a 'prenex' 2° sentence and T\-<f>^Kj><o=*T\-o^Kj>).
Proof. (1) Suppose first that <J> is 2°-con over T and that TV a. Then r + ^l-a^-Ki));
and therefore T h a -< (-i<f>). Suppose conversely that ri-a=»7'l-a<(-iif)) for any 'prenex' 2° sentence a. We want to show <f> 2°-con, so let a' be 2° and 7" + <¡> h a'. Then 7" implies the 2° sentence nfVc' and so, by assumption, T r-(-1$ V "0 "< ("»*)• But (("»♦VO'*> -i </>)-» a' and therefore T h a'.
(2) Suppose </> is a 2° sentence. For reference, call the statement " for any 'prenex' sentence a in 2°, if 7 I-<f> -» <f> < a then T Y a -» </>" by the name of ( + ). Suppose (+), and that <n is 'prenex' IIo and T + <f>\-it. Then (*) T h<J>-» w; and so 7" I-1<£ -»<p -< (-i w). Applying ( + ), T\-iw-»</>; i.e. (**) T \-1^> -» w. Combining (*) with (**), 7 V it. Now suppose that ( + ) is false and produce a 2° sentence a such that T h <f> -» <£> -< a but 711/ a -* <£. Consider the n° sentence -i (a ^ <p), which is a consequence of <}> because <j> < a is a consequence of <J>. We will show that </> is II°-non by showing th&tTV -i(a < </>): From -i(a < </>) we can infer in T that a -*<i> -< a and therefore a -»<£. But a was chosen so that T V a -></>. □ Examples occurring in nature. For the moment we are principally concerned with 2° and n°. Definitions 1.3. 7* is T-correct iff whenever <p is a r-sentence and T h</>, then <f> is true.
If 7 is r.e., 9 is a Rosser sentence for T iff PA h 0 <-» Thm^ r -i 0n ) -< Thmr( r0"" ). (The self-reference lemma guarantees the existence of Rosser sentences. A Rosser sentence is guaranteed to be independent of 7".)
For the rest of this section T is r.e. Example 1.4. -iCon(T) is IT0-con over T. This has been observed by several people, including the author. The first to do so was Kreisel, several years ago (see [Kreisel] ). [Macintyre-Simmons] independently obtained an abstract version imposing only weak conditions on T and Thmr.
Example 1.5. Any Rosser sentence for 7 is n°-non over T. Proof. Let a be Rosser for T, and let </> be the sentence Thmr(r -, a1 ) < Thmr( V ), and 9 be Thmr( V ). Then 7 h <¡> -► <|> -< 9, and so, to show that ^-hence a-is n°-non it will suffice (by Lemma 1.2) to 52 D. GUASPARI show that T V 9 -> <¡>. But if 7 Y 9 -* <J>, then 7" h Thmr( ""a1 ) -» a; and so by [Lob] , T Y a. That is impossible, because a Rosser sentence for 7 cannot be T provable. Example 1.6 (Smorynski). Con(T) is 2°-con iff T is 2°-correct. Proof. The difficult part is to show: T 2°-incorrect implies Con(T) is 2°-non. (The easy part, besides being easy, is a consequence of Theorem 2.1; whose proof is also skipped.) Let * be any 2° sentence and <p be such that T proves <t> <-> (Thmr(""-np^V*)** Thmr( r<f>n ). As usual, (i) TV -,$.
Here, for the first and last time, is a detailed elaboration of "as usual": Suppose 7" I-i<f>. Then there is a k G w such that T proves: k witnesses Thm^ r -i <p1 ). Since T is consistent, T V <f>; and therefore (because ProofT is a binumeration) for every n G w, T Y n does not witness Thm^ r^>"1 ). Reason now in 7: Thm^ r -Kp1 ) =< Thmr(r<i>1 ); so (Thmr(r-,<i>"1 ) V *) < Thm^ r<pn ); so <?>. That contradicts the consistency of T. Notice that the proof of (i) depends only on the assumption that T is consistent, hence:
(ii) T + Con(7") I--iThmr(r -k/)1 ). The next claim is the crucial one:
(iii) If \¡/ is true, so is </>. Let a be the formula (Thmr(r -i^1 ) V VO ^ Thm^ r<f>~[ ). If \p is true then a is decidable (in N). What if a is false? Then it must be the case that N \-i a, so T Y -i a, so T Y -\ <j>-a contradiction. So a, hence <f>, must be true.
That reasoning can also be formalized in T + Con(7"), for it used only (i) and the knowledge that the truth of either 2° sentence 9 or A guarantees the decidability of 9 < A; which fact can be formalized in PA. So:
(iv) T + Con(T) Y * -» «p. (In fact, T + Con(7) Y * <h></>.) Similar but easier reasoning shows that:
(v) (7 Y </>) iff xp is true. Now we are ready to go. Suppose that T is 2°-incorrect, and let * be a false 2° sentence proved by T. Let <p be as above. By (v), T \f <p. But by (iv), T + Con(T) h * -> <í> and therefore T + Con(T) Y </>. So Con(7") is 2°-non.
Example 1.7 (Exploiting the weakness of PA). There is a 2° sentence 9 such that /M + 9 is consistent and proves IIo sentences (truths) unprovable in ZFC; while ZFC + 9 is inconsistent.
Proof. Let a be Rosser over Z7C. Then a is independent of ZFC and a slight extension of Lemma 1.2 (proved by the same arguments) shows that PA + a proves IIo sentences not provable in ZFC. Let 9 be such that PA proves: 9<r+(o /\ Thm^ r -\91))< Thm^( r9 7 ). Then 9 is stronger than a (so PA + 9 proves IT0 sentences not provable in ZFC) and, since 9 -» -iCon(PA), 9 is disprovable in ZFC. (That this example is slightly phoney License or copyright restrictions may apply to redistribution; see https://www.ams.org/journal-terms-of-use can be seen by asking: Just how is it we know that PA + a is consistent? The IT0 theory of PA + 9 is contained in the IIo theory of ZFC + Con(ZFC).) 2. Existence theorems. Here is what the examples leave open: If T is r.e. is there an independent T sentence which is r-con over 7"? (-iCon(T) need not be independent.) If T is 2°-correct is there any independent IT0 sentence which is 2°-non over T1 The answers are, respectively, Yes and No. First, the No.
Theorem 2.1. If T is r.e., the following are equivalent:
(1) 7 is 2°-correct.
(2) Every IT0 sentence consistent with T is '¿'¡-con over T.
(3) Every 7-A° sentence is decided by T.
Proof. (1) => (2) => (3). Easy exercises. (The implications do not, in fact, depend on T being r.e.)
(3) =s> (1). Prove the contrapositive. Let o be a 'prenex' 2° sentence which is false but T provable. Let 9 be a 2° sentence such that 7 proves: 0«-» Thmr( rn»V("V Thmr( r91 )). As usual, 9 is independent of T. From the point of view of T, the truth of a entails the decidability-i.e., the A°-ness-of 9. More exactly: 9 literally is 2°; and a implies that -i 9 <-» [(a V Thmr( r91))< Thmr(r -, 91 )]. So 9 is T-A°. □ Notes to Theorem 2.1. The implication -,(1)=> -,(3) is ineffective: For every e G w, let Te = PA u all sentences of LA with g.n.'s in the eth r.e. subset of co. There is no recursive function / such that Te consistent and 2°-incorrect implies f(e) codes an independent 7^-A0 pair (meaning a pair (a, it) such that a is 2?, w is H°, Te Y a <-+ it, and T V a). Proof. Suppose there is such an /. Notice that if (a, it) is an independent 7^-A" pair then it -> a is false and Te provable. So from / we get a map e h* ae G 2° such that: Te consistent and 2rincorrect => ae is false and Te provable. Then " Te is consistent and 2°-correct" is, as a predicate of e, a Boolean combination of r.e. predicates, being equivalent to "Te is consistent and (T \i aeor ae is true)". That is impossible, for {e\Te is consistent and 2°-correct} can easily be seen to be a complete n° subset of w.
It will be convenient to formulate two lemmas axiomatizing the proof of the existence theorems-at the cost of some annoying notation.
Notation and setting for Lemma 2.2. 7 is r.e. and Proof T is a binumeration. If * is a 'prenex' 2° and 9 a 'prenex' 2° sentence, then * * 9 = 3u(u witnesses *) A Vx, df v < «(Proofr( v, x) -> 2°-true("x < r9~* ")).
Note that \p * 9 is 7"-2°. For an explanation of 2°-True, see Fact 0.2; for "x< r01" see the end of §0. Lemma 2.2. Suppose that PA Y 9<r+\p * 9. Then, (1) * is true => TY9,
(2) \p is false => -, 0 is 2°-con over every subtheory of T.
Proof. (1) Suppose that * is true, and let k be the least witness to *. Then T (in fact, PA) proves:
( + ) **0<-»Vx, v<k (Proof r(v, x)-> 2°-True("x < r91")). For any theory containing N, a bounded quantifier is the same as a disjunction. I.e., it is provable that Vw < n<p(«) ■*-» (<i>(0) A ' * * A<Kn))-Therefore if Xi» • • • » X* is the list of 2° sentences T-provable by proofs with g.n.'s less than k, it follows from ( + ) that T proves:
(*) A\ X,; and also /t\ 2°-True( rx, -< 0n ) -* * * 0, hence (♦*)/X\(* <*)-*• Now reason in 7": Suppose -,0. By (**), -, /V\ (x, -< 0). Together with (*) this implies \X/(0 ** x)> hence 0. We have shown -,0 -» 0; so 0.
(2) Now suppose that * is false and 7' Ç T. It will suffice, by Lemma 1.2, to show that for any a in 2°: If 7" Y a, then 7" h a -< 0. So suppose 7" h a. Then T Y a. Let & be a g.n. of a T-proof of a. Since * is false 7" proves: Proof r(k, V)Ak, ro~* < any possible witness to *. Therefore 7" proves * * 9 -* 2"-True( ra -< 0n ), so proves 0 -» a ■< 0. From 0 -» a -< 0 and a it follows that a < 9. So 7" h a ■< 0. □ Notation and setting for Lemma 2.3. With T, Proof T, *, and 0 as before, define *+0 = 3y,p((\) no witness for* is < v orp; df (2) p is the g.n. of a n° sentence;
(3) Proofr(v, "T9r ^>p"); and (4)2°-True("^")).
Again, *+0 is 2j¡.
(2) * is false => 0 w n°-con ouer euery subtheory of T.
Proof. (1) Suppose that * is true and let k witness *. Then T proves: *+0 ♦+ 3v, p < k (p is n° A Proofs v, " r0n -+p") A 2"-True(" ^/>")). As before there is a list Xi> • • • > Xm °f sentences (this time each is 11°) such that T proves (*) /Y\(0 -» X); and *+0 ** W 2"-True(r -.fc1 X hence (♦♦)#->W-»x,.
But (*) and (**) together imply -,0.
(2) Suppose * is false. Let T' Q T and tbeallj sentence such that License or copyright restrictions may apply to redistribution; see https://www.ams.org/journal-terms-of-use partially conservative extensions of arithmetic 55 7" Y 9 -> ir. Then 7 Y 9 -» it, so let A: be a g.n. of a T-proof of 0 -» w. 7" proves: k, V < any possible witness to *. Now reason in 7". Suppose -, it. Then 2°,-True( r -ht1); therefore *+0, and therefore 0. But we know that 9 -> it. So 77. We have shown that -, w -» w. Therefore w. □ Note to Lemma 2.3. The definition of *+0 used above is due to Solovay and is considerably simpler and leads to a considerably simpler proof of the lemma than the author's original definition.
Theorem 2.4. Let T be r.e. Then we can find, effectively from any r.e. index for T, an independent T sentence which is T-con over every subtheory of T.
Proof. We will prove this for the case T = 2°. The proof for 11° is similar. By the self-reference lemma we can effectively find a 2° sentence 0 such that PA proves: 0^Thmr(r -,0"') * 0.
The sentence we want is -, 0. It will suffice to show that T V -, 0; for that guarantees that Thm^ r -, 01 ) is false, hence by Lemma 2.2(2) that -, 0 is 2°-con over any suitable 7" (and "nonprovable and 2°-con" certainly guarantees "independent"). So suppose instead that T Y -, 0. Then Thmr(r-,01) is true; so by Lemma 2.2(1) T Y 9, contradicting the consistency of T.
If T = U°", find a 2°<¡> such that </> <h> Thmr( r</>n )+<f>. □
We will call <f> essentially T over T if T is its simplest classification in T, and exactly T-con if T is the most complicated class for which <p is conservative. More exactly:
Definition 2.5. <¡> is essentially T over T iff $ G T but <p £ T -t.
<p is exactly T-con over T iff <p is T-con but T-non over T. The next theorem says just what you might expect-that we can obtain any not-obviously-absurd combination of essentially T and exactly T'-con.
Theorem 2.6. Let T be r.e. and T' Q T. Then, effectively from an r.e. index for T we can find a sentence which is essentially T and exactly T'-con over every subtheory of T.
Proof. To keep the notation in hand take a special case: suppose T' = ITâ nd T = 2°¡. Let it be an independent n° sentence which is 2°-con over every subtheory of 7; and a be an independent 2° sentence which is üg-con over every subtheory of T + it. Let <p be it A <*, and 7" be any subtheory of T. Then <p is n°-non over 7" because <p implies it. Further, <p is 2°-con, and therefore exactly 2°-con: For if 0 is 2° and T + ir + a Y 9, then (because a is Tig-con over T + ir)T + itY 9; and so (because it is 2?rcon over T) T Y 9. To complete the proof we need to show that <p is not equivalent in 7' to any IT0, sentence. So suppose that 0 is n^ and that 7" Y <¡> *-> 9. Then infer succès-56 D. GUASPARI sively: 7" h (w A <0 <-»• 9; T + irY 0-because a is Tig-con over 7* + w; 7" + w Y <p; 7' + 7T Y a. The last statement contradicts the 7 + w independence of a. D Note to Theorems 2.4 and 2.6. That the sentences provided in Theorems 2.4 and 2.6 are conservative over so many theories is somewhat surprising, since "<j> is T-con over T" is, at least by its looks, a truly global property of T. It is of course trivial to produce </>, 7", and T with T' Q T and <p T-con over T but not over 7'. Theorem 2.7 (Solovay). Let T be r.e. Then for any T there is a T sentence <j> such that:
<f> is T-con over T and -,</> is T-con over T.
Proof. Notice that the "subtheory property" is not claimed for <¡>. The parts of the argument through which that claim cannot pass will be starred (and remarked upon at the end).
Let a be a 2° sentence such that PA proves:
a<-» 3y,p((l)y,p < any 7"proof of ""a"1 AP is the g.n. of a 2° sentence;
(2)Proof7.UMra'1 ->/>");
(3)2°-True("^jp");
(4) Vj, t < v(Proofr(f, s) -* 2°-True("i < V "))).
Denote the formula to the right of the <-> sign by 'A'. By ignoring (4) we see that, in the notation of Lemma 2.3, PA Y a -»Thmr(ra1 )+a. That fact suffices to carry out the argument of part (1) of Lemma 2.3. So, if Thmr( ro~l ) is true then T Y -, a-a contradiction. We have Fact I. TV a.
Fact 2. a is TI°-con over T. Proof. Suppose T Y a -* it and let k be the g.n. of a T-proof of a -*ir. Reason in T: Suppose -, it. Then -, a. If we substitute k for "y" and V for "p" then clauses (l)-(3) of A are true. So the only way that a can be false is for (4) to fail, i.e.:
(i) 3s, t < k(Proofr(i, s) A -,2°-True ("s < V ")).
(Now step outside of T for a moment and produce Xi, • • • > Xm_tne ^°s entences provable in 7 by proofs with g.n.'s < k. Go back to 7.) Therefore, (*) AC\Xi> and, because we are assuming -\ir, XA/^Od ~< °0-(That last remark is a consequence of the tail end of (i).) Since -, a, the only way to have -,(x < o) is to have -\x¡-We have shown: //\x¡ A(->"'-* W ~~"Xi)-le-, we have shown it. this last is easily arranged. Let A: be a g.n. of a 7"-proof of x-We know that a is n°-con over T and hence that for any * G Tl°, if TY a -» * then T Y *. Therefore (..) \fy,p < k(p is n° A Proofr( v, " V ^p") -» IT°-True(/>)) is equivalent to a finite conjunction of 7 provable statements, so is itself T provable. What (**) entails, and this entailment is formalizable in T, is that if a is to be true, any candidate to play the role of the "y" in A must be > k. Hence: // a is true, rx~l and k must fall within the range of the bounded quantifier in clause (4) of A, and therefore a -» 2°-True( rx <■ o1 ). Formalizing in 7 gives T Y a -* x "< °-Now reason in T: We know that a -> x ■< o and that x-Therefore x "< a-But that, together with (nV»)^ X_see (ii)-implies -, it. We have proven -iw. □ Notes to Theorem 2.7. In the proof of Fact 2, the subtheory property escapes at (*). Suppose, at that point, that we are trying to reason in 7" G T. We know that -i w -»• \X/ -i(Xi "< °)> hut not that /y\x-for the x's are consequences of 7". There is no way, in 7", to bring those sentences into collision. One trouble spot in the proof of Fact 3 is (**). We need all of T to prove (**)-and would still need all of T even if, by magic, a were TI°-con over 7". Definition 2.8. <p is essentially A° over T iff <f> is T-A° but not 7'-2°_1 or <j> is exactly A°-con over T iff <i> is A°-con, but 2°-non and Tf^-non, over T.
Corollary 2.9. Let T be r.e. and n > m > 1. Then there is a sentence which is essentially A° and exactly ùPm-con over T.
Proof. It will suffice to prove the theorem for the case n = m + 1, the general result following by iterating in the manner of Theorem 2.6. Say m = 4, n = 5. Let a be a 2^ sentence which is n°-con over T and for which -, a is 2°,-con over T. Let ir be a n°, sentence which is 2°,-con and independent over T + a. We want <¡> =dtir /\o. Clearly <f> is A°, Tl^-non, and 2°,-non over T. To see that <p is A°,-con: Suppose P is Tl% S is 2°, TY P<-> S, and T + <p I-P(AS)-Then 7" + a h w <-> S and so by choice of it, T + a Y S. So T + a Y P, and by choice of a, T Y P. To see that <p is neither T-~2° nor T-Ll0,: Suppose S is 2°, and T Y <¡> <-» 5. Then T + a I-tt <-» S contradicting the essential n°,-ness of it over T + a. Suppose P is 1X5 and T Y <p <-» F. Then 7* I-i a -» -i P, and by choice of a, T h -, P. So 7" I-,<p, which is impossible. D Notes to Corollary 2.9. Only the last step required use of Theorem 2.7. That is where the subtheory property is lost. Mixing Theorem 2.4 and Corollary 2.9 does not yield, e.g., an essentially 2°, sentence which is exactly 58 D. GUASPARI A°¡-con. Whether all reasonable combinations of n, 2, and A can be obtained I do not know.
Our last existence theorem simply codifies the effectiveness available in the proofs of Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3. It helps partially to classify {</>|<p is T-con over T] for r.e. T by showing that it cannot be an r.e. set of formulas.
Lemma 2.10. Let X be an r.e. subset ofu and T an r.e. theory. Then, for any T, there is a recursive map k*-+ 9k G T, such that: k<EX=>TY -, 0*. k £ X =» 9k is independent and T-con over every subtheory of T.
Proof. Consider the case T = n°. Let *(x) be a 2° predicate which, in the real world, defines X. For each k produce <¡>k such that (in the notation of Lemma 2.2), PA proves: <Pfc « (*(k) V Thmr( r -kí», 1 )) * </v
We are going to apply Lemma 2.2 repeatedly. Since the truth of either Thm^ r -, (¡>k n ) or *(k) implies that T Y $k, we have for any k:
and by the other half of Lemma 2.2, (iii) ¿íí=> *(k) V Thmr( r -,<?* 1 ) is false => -¡<¡>k is 2°-con and independent over any subtheory of T.
Let 9k be (a n° sentence equivalent to) -><pfc. The other case is similar. □ By iterating the steps in the lemma as in the proof of Theorem 2.6, we get:
Theorem 2.11. Let 7 be r.e. and T' C T. Then every IT? subset of <o is reducible to either of the sets:
{<j>\<¡> is essentially T and exactly T'-con over T}. {</>!<> is essentially T and exactly T'-con over every subtheory of T).
It seems worth noting one more restatement of the existence lemmas which is cute and sometimes useful. Say that *(x) is T-disjunctive (over T) iff for every sentence x G T and any n G w, T Y *(n) V X implies T Y *(n) or T Y x-Theorem 2.12. Let X be an r.e. subset of u and T an r.e. theory. Then there is a *(x) G T such that * numerates X in 7 and * is T-disjunctive.
Proof. To be consistent with the notation of 2.10 we will make * G T and f-disjunctive. Let the map k h» 9k G T be as in 2.10, and let x t-> 9X be the formalization of that map. Set *(*)-f-True("^0x"). df Since T Y *(n) <-» -, 0" for each n G co, * numerates X. Suppose now that X G T and T Y *(n) V X, but T V *(n). Then n & X and therefore 0" is f-con over T; and, since T Y -, *(n) -» x, T Y 9" -^ Whether 7 is essentially reflexive depends solely on the nonarithmetical part of T. All extensions of PA in the same language as PA are essentially reflexive. ZF (and any extension in the same language) is essentially reflexive. GB is not (for an essentially reflexive theory cannot be finitely axiomatized). (See [Montague] .)
The connections between interpretability and iTJ-con are easily stated:
Theorem 3.2 (Hajek, largely). Let T be r.e. and essentially reflexive. Then, <f> is interpretable in 7 iff </> is Ttf-con over T.
Proof. Say that </> is strongly consistent with T if for every finite F Q T, T Y Con(F + <j>). [Hajek,l] shows that for r.e. essentially reflexive T, <f> is strongly consistent with T iff <b is interpretable in T. Thus it will more than suffice to show:
Claim. If 7 is essentially reflexive (not necessarily r.e.), then <¡> is n?-con over T iff <j> is strongly consistent with T.
Proof. Suppose first that </> is n°-con over T and let F ç T be finite. Since T is essentially reflexive, T Y /Y\ F /\<>^>Con(/)(\F A </>H-e., TY<¡>^> Con(F + <b). Since <b is Ti°-con over T, T Y Con(F + <j>). Suppose, conversely, that for every finite F ç T, T Con Y (F + </>). Suppose that it is Tí? and T + <í> Y ir. Produce a finite F Ç T such that F + <p Y ir. We may as well assume N Ç F. Then T Y Thm^+^í rir1 ). Now reason in T: If ->7T, then ThnLy(r -, it1 ), so ThmP+^rir /\ -iir1); contradicting Con(F+ <f>). Since -, it implies a contradiction, it. □ Notes to Theorem 3.2. [Hájek, 2] shows that if T contains induction for all formulas of T (no assumption about reflexiveness or recursive enumerability) then every sentence interpretable in T is TI0-conservative over T. A slight elaboration of that argument is used in 6.5.
The hypothesis " T is essentially reflexive" cannot merely be omitted from the hypothesis of 3.2. Consider GB, which is not essentially reflexive (nor does it contain induction for all formulas). Then I, the set of sentences interpretable in GB, is r.e. (because GB is finitely axiomatizable), while C, the set of sentences üpcon over GB, is not (by 2.11). So 7 # C. More is known: Solovay has shown that 7 \ C =^ 0; and Hájek has observed that C \ 7 ^ 0 follows easily from Lemma 2.3. 60 D. GUASPARI I owe thanks to Hájek and Svejdar for clearing up my confusions about these things.
An interpretation of </> in T provides a proof of the consistency of T + <j> relative to 7. Whether this consistency proof is "elementary" depends on the presentation of that interpretation. Suppose our measure of elementary is this: Con(T) -* Con(7 + </>) can be proven in PA. Our reductive attitude about the formulation of Con( 7") will come in handy (and may make the next result appear to say more than it does say). If, as in [Feferman], we let Conb e the consistency statement naturally based on * (and let *'(•*) abbreviate \p(x) V x = r<(>1 ), then the meaning-and presumably the provability-of Con^ -> Coiy depends strongly on *. By choosing particular representations of Con ( 7) and Con( T + <f>)-which are related in the natural way-such difficulties are dodged. If $ is a Rosser sentence for T, then there is an elementary proof of the relative consistency of T + </>, even though T + <j> cannot be interpreted in T. The next theorem says that even if <f> is 2°, the existence of an interpretation of T + <J> in T need not guarantee the existence of an elementary relative consistency proof for <j>. (The point, again, is that </> is so simple.) Theorem 3.3. Let T be r.e. and essentially reflexive. Then there is a 2°s entence $ such that <j> is interpretable in T but PA V Con(7") -» Con(T + <j>).
Proof. Choose <i> so that, in the notation of Lemma 2.3, <¡> <-» Thmf/( (Con( T ) -» Con( T + </>))+ <f>.
We will apply Lemma 2.3 repeatedly. If PA Y Con(T) -► Con(r + <i>) then by part (1) of the lemma, 7 Y -,<$>. So PAY -¡ConiT + <f>) and therefore PA Y -,Con(7)-which is impossible because PA is 2°-correct. Since PA V Con(T) -» Con( 7 + <f>), part (2) of the lemma guarantees that <j> is iTj-con and therefore interpretable in T. □ Here is how TI°-con can be understood in terms of interpretability. Say that an interpretation 7 of 7' in T(C 7") is provably T-faithful if for every sentence x in T, 7 Y Xj -* X-(Here Xj is the interpretation of x-See [Shoenfield].) Theorem 3.4. Let T be r.e. and essentially reflexive and <f> any sentence in the language of T. Then, $ is ITjJ-cow over T iff there is a provably Ti°n-faithful interpretation of T + <¡> in T.
Proof. The implication from right to left is immediate. Suppose conversely, that <j> is n°-con over T. For each finite F Q T consider the sentence <¡>F:
Vjc(2° -True(jc) -> the theory whose axioms are rFn, r<t>1, and x is consistent). Then 7 + <> Y <¡>F; and since <f>F is IT0,, 7 Y <1>F. Using that fact and the tricks in [Feferman] we can find a formula */,(jc) binumerating T in T such that T Y Con *2, where *2(jc) is (2°-True(^) V *i(*) V x = r<b1 ). From the point of view of T, *2 is the theory consisting of T (or at least that fragment of 7 described by *" which of course is a numeration of T, but is not T provably equal to T), <j>, and all the true 2° sentences. By 5.9 of [Feferman], slightly modified, there is a formula x(*) such that T proves: "{x|x(^)} is a complete Henkin extension of {x\\p2(.x)}." (A Henkin theory is one in which every provable existential statement is witnessed by some constant.) In particular, if a is 2° then, since T Y a -» 2°-True( ra1 ), we have T Y a -* x( ro1 )• By imitating the usual construction of a model from a complete Henkin theory we can extract from x an interpretation 7 of T + $ in 7 such that for any sentence 0 of T, T Y x( r0n ) *-> 9¡. Now suppose that it is n° and reason in T: -, it -> x( r -it1 ), -*(-\ir)¡, -> ~i{ir¡). So ir¡ -* ir. □ The argument in effect constructs inside T a model of T + <f> which extends the "standard" one (standard from the point of view of T) and is elementary for 2°,_1 formulas. An attempt to produce some corresponding theorem for 2° would seem to require us to build not extensions but submodels; yet T thinks that its number structure is the minimal one. 4. Generalizations. Extending the language of arithmetic. If L extends LA define PAL to be PA + induction for all formulas in L. Define 2°(L) and n°(L) in the obvious way. The self-reference lemma holds for PAL; and if L' Ç L has only finitely many symbols other than constant symbols (in particular, if L is finite) we can define 2°(L') truth by a 2°(L') formula. The only important difference between L and LA is this: 7 might not decide all the AjJ(L) sentences. If one wants to check the extendability of an argument from LA to L that is the first point to check. In particular, if L is finite the existence theorems 2.4, 2.6, 2.7, 2.9, 2.10 all hold with 'T(L)" replacing "T" everywhere. (Note: the * of Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 must be 2°, not 2°(L)-indeed, the statement "* is true" is probably nonsensical otherwise.) It is easy to construct an r.e. theory T in an infinite language L for which every formula is T-A%(L): let (Sn\n G w> be a sequence of new symbols such that each Sn defines truth for the formulas in 2°,(/Vl u {SQ, . . ., Sn_t}). To extend the theorems mentioning reflexiveness it is necessary to formulate a stronger notion of reflexive. Roughly, T is essentially-L-reflexive iff for every <p, T Y $ -> Con(<í> + all the true A°,(L) sentences). If L is finite all extensions of PAL having language L are essentially L-reflexive. All the results of §3 go through if "essentially reflexive" is everywhere strengthened to "essentially-L-reflexive." Set theory. Use 2", n" for the classes in the Levy hierarchy. The existence theorems will follow once we have a workable definition of <f> =< x-Define x < * v to mean: x G the transitive closure of { v}; and x < *y if f x < *v and x ^ v. Define <f> < x as before, using < * in place of < . If <¡> and x are 'prenex' 2", so is <J> =< x-Our 0Qly worry: =< * is a partial, but not total, order. One of the arrows in Lemma 1.2 fails, but it is not one that hurts. The proofs of Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 go through if we simply replace 2°-True by 2"-True. So Theorems 2.6, 2.7, 2.10 generalize. We could beef up the language and talk about 2"(L)-there are no problems.
The theorems on interpretations go through as before, but there is a slight difference in spirit. The models corresponding to the interpretations are not even extensions of the originals, let alone true outer models (i.e., end extensions). To "correct" this we could try reworking some of the theorems to apply to Lxa. Here is how one looks-one which will be useful in §6. (Elementary knowledge of Lxu is assumed. What we need is contained in the first few chapters of [Barwise, 1] and [Keisler] .) Our language contains G and, for each set x, a constant x which will turn out to be a name for x. Let Xx be the usual infini tary sentence saying that x denotes x. (A transitive set satisfies Xx iff it contains x.) Define Proof"<,( y; z, x) to mean: using the usual axioms and rules for LK1J, x is a deduction of z from assumptions y u {Ajx G V). Proof " is ZF-A,. We obtain from Proof"" the 2, formulas Thm^y; z)-"z is a theorem of y u [\\x G V}"; and Con00(y)-"y u {aJx G V} is consistent." The proof of the claim in 3.2 is a roadmap for the proof of (2) Can Theorem 2.6 be extended to allow all not-obviously-absurd combinations of TI, 2, and A?
Classifying T-con. Let T be r.e. Here is what is known: (a) (<í>|<í> is T-con over T] is, by inspection, a TL® subset of w; and, by 2.11, cannot be r.e. (b) Solovay has shown that if T is essentially reflexive, then {<¡>\(¡> is n°-con over 7} is a complete n2 subset of w. So:
(3) Is {<¡>\<¡> is T-con over 7} a complete LTf subset of w?1 6. Partially conservative extensions: Semantics. This section contains model theoretic characterizations of partially conservative sentences-characterizations which have been forshadowed by the syntactical arguments of §3 which mimicked model constructions. Some of the proofs can be carried out very smoothly using the machinery of admissible covers [Barwise, 1] but others ' Hajek has shown that {<f>|<(> is T-con over PA} is a IlJ complete subset of a.
License or copyright restrictions may apply to redistribution; see https://www.ams.org/journal-terms-of-use cannot-not, at least, in any obvious way. The problem seems to be that compactness arguments, useful as they are for extending models, are not so good at producing submodels. Instead we will use and/or modify a series of theorems and definitions from [Friedman], few of which will be stated in their most general form.
The results about models of arithmetic can be read independently of those about set theory. We will assume the reader knows some basic facts about models of set theory-in particular, that he knows the definition of "standard part". (See e.g., [Friedman] or [Barwise, 1] .) We will always identify the standard part of a model of set theory with the transitive set to which it is isomorphic.
From now on say that F is a number theory if for some not necessarily finite language L, T is an extension of PAL with language L (i.e., the only sort is the number sort). F is a set theory if for some language L, T is an extension of ZFL with language L. (ZFL is ZF + comprehension, collection, and foundations for all formulas of L.) We will perpetrate the small abuse of crediting every model of set theory with being a model of PA. Definition 6.1. A' is c-closed (for "completion closed") iff X is a collection of subsets of w such that: (i) X is closed under Turing join and "recursive in"; (ii) whenever y G X codes an infinite binary tree, some path through that tree is in X.
The terminology "completion closed" is suggested by the fact that if A' is c-closed and 7 G X is a consistent theory, then some complete extension of T is an element of X. Definition 6.2. If 911 is an w-nonstandard model of arithmetic then xGss(91t) if x Q « and for some </>(x,y) and some b G |91t|, x = (ne«|91t 1= <Kn, b)}. The sets in ss(9lt)-read "the standard system of 911 "-are all in fact initial segments of A°,-definable classes. Define uev to mean that the Hth prime divides v. Then standard sets all have the form {/je<o|911 N n G a} for some suitable (nonstandard) a G |91t|. The corresponding syntactical notion is: bi(F) = {x Ç <o|x is binumerated in the theory T). Theorem 6.3 ([Friedman], modified), (i) V9lt(91L models PA => ss(91t) is c-closed).
(ii) 7/ X is countable and c-closed, T a consistent set or number theory, and bi(F) ç X, then 3911(911 N 7 and ss(91t) = X).
These results are more or less contained in Theorems 2.4 and 2.5 of [Friedman]-see especially the discussion of Z on pp. 541-542. Part (ii) above does not quite follow from Friedman's 2.5 but is proved by the same argument. Our primary interest in 6.3 lies in the following embedding 64 D. GUASPARI theorem-which shows that an obviously necessary condition for "91 is an end extension of 91L" is also sufficient. Theorem 6.4 ([Friedman], modified). Let L be a countable language and T a number theory (resp. set theory) with language L. Suppose that 9IL and 91 are countable u-nonstandard models of T. Then, 91 is (isomorphic to) an end extension of 9H if and only if ss(91L) = ss(9L) and every 2?(L) {resp., 2,(L)) sentence true in 9lt is true in 91.
Theorem 4.2 of [Friedman] is not about end extensions of models for set theory, but rather what are sometimes called "rank extensions"-all the new elements in the larger model having ordinal rank greater than any ordinal of the smaller model. However, a proof of 6.4 (above) is embedded in Friedman's proof.
If 91L models PA, say that 9IL7-models F if 91L t= F and F G ss(91L). This stands in for the property that F be numerable in F. It is trivial to check that if 9lt Y T there is some elementary extension 91 of 911 which F-models F. Theorem 6.5. Let T be a number theory in a finite language L and <j> be any sentence of L. Then, (i) <J> is n°(L)-con over F<=> every T-model of T can be end extended to a model of T + </>. Matijasevic's theorem, hereinafter referred to as [M] , says that every 2°f ormula is equivalent in PA to a purely existential formula. (This does not generalize to 2°(L)!) From [M], 6.5, and the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem it easily follows that Theorem 6.6 [M]. If L = LA, then 6.5 remains true if "end extension" is replaced by "extension"; and even if "countable" is dropped from the statement of (Ü). Proof of 6.5. (i) The implication from right to left is trivial: Suppose that every F-model of F can be end extended to model F + <f>, and that ir is Ttf(L) and 7 + <f> I-ir. We will show that every model of F models <f>. Let 9IL N F.
There exists a F-model of F, 9L', which is an elementary extension of 91L. By assumption we can produce an end extension 91 of 9IL' modelling F + £. Then 91 ^ ir; and since n°(L) sentences persist downward to initial segments, 91L' t= 77. Therefore 9H N it.
Suppose conversely that <j> is TT?(L)-con over F. Examine the proof of 3.4. The recursive enumerability of F was used only to guarantee the existence of a numeration of F in F. So expand F to 7" by adding a one place predicate ST, induction for all new formulas, and {$( "V )|x S T) u { -, ?T( "V )|x £ F}. F' is a conservative extension of F, so <f> is TI0(L)-con over T' and the proof of 3.4 proceeds as before. It provides an interpretation 7 with the following properties: (a) There is a T' definable function ai->a; with meaning "uj is the interpretation of the nth numeral (hence u is the denotation of Uj)". (b) T' proves that function embeds < as an initial segment of </ and, for any R G L, that R(u, . . . , v) <h» R, (u" . . ., v¡) . If 91L F-models F we can expand 9H to a model 91L' of T' and then pull out the interpretation 7 to a structure 91 with domain = {Z>|9R/ t= b is in the universe of 7} (ii) The proof of the right to left implication is dual to the proof in (i). So suppose that <j> is 2,(L)-con over F and that 911 is countable and 91L 7-models F. Let S = {ir G n°(F)|91t N ir). Because <í> is 2?(L)-con over F, F' =df F u S u {<£} is consistent. Since F admits a n°(L) truth definition S G ss(9IL)-and by the closure properties of ss(9lt), V G ss(9lt) and bi(F) Ç ss(9lt). Apply 6.3 to get an 91 N 7" with ss(9l) = ss(9IL). Because 91 Y S, every 2?(L) sentence true in 91 is true in 911. So 91 is a model of F + </> which (by 6.4) can be embedded as an initial segment of 9L. □ Notes to 6.5 and 6.6. (1) The method of 6.5(i) for constructing end extensions seems to be well known.
(2) For any theory S in any language it is trivial to see that a sentence <j> is (universal sentences)-con over S iff every model of S can be extended to model S + <j>. Accordingly, the characterization of TTj-con provided in 6.6 is an immediate consequence of [M] . The corresponding fact about 2? does not follow from [M] by "trivial model theory".
(3) Model theoretic equivalents of TI°(F)-con and 2°(L)-con are immediate: every F-model of F can be end extended to (is an end extension of) a model of F + <í> which is elementary for 2°_ ,(F) sentences.
The proofs of corresponding theorems for set theories are identical with (or dual to) the proof of 6.5(h). (Notice that every model of set theory has an elementary extension which is a non-w-model.) They are stated separately in order to emphasize: (i) that we consider only w-nonstandard models of ZF; (ii) that 6.5(i) alone has no cardinality restriction. Theorem 6.7. Let T be a set theory in a countable language L and <f> any sentence of L. Then, (i) <b is Tl¡(L)-con over F<=> every countable u-nonstandard T-model of T can be end extended to a model ofT + <j>.
(ii) <£ is 2j(L)-coai over F<=> every countable u-nonstandard T-model of T is an end extension of a model of T + <j>.
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The necessity of restricting attention ot w-nonstandard models of set theory is shown by the following example. Theorem 6.8. There is a 2, sentence </> such that <b is Tl^con over ZF but ZF proves that the theory ZF + <f> has no a-model.
Proof. Let <j> be a 2, sentence such that ZF proves <p<-»3 finite x Q ZF(-iConx(x u { r*1 })). §4 contains the definition of Con^,. We will show first that ZF + <¡> cannot have an w-model.
Let LST be the (finitary) language of set theory. Consider the following metamathematical fact (proof deferred):
(i) For any sentence <¡> of LST, ZFY §-+ Con«,^}). The proof of (i) can be arithmetized, to give:
(ii) PA Y For any x in LST, ThmZF("x -h> Con^f *})"). Applying (ii) inside ZF, we get a theorem of ZF about models of ZF: Proof of (i). We will prove the contrapositive. Suppose -\Conx({<¡>}). Produce a set p such that Proof ^,(0; r-,<f>n,/>). By the reflection principle there is a transitive set M such that p G M and (*) <> <-» (<t>)M. The axioms from which the proof p proceeds are all of form Xx for x G M. (That each such x is in M is a consequence of the usual procedure for coding proofs; alternately, the reflection principle guarantees that we can choose M large enough to contain them all.) So M satisfies each axiom of p. Since LK« is sound, M satisfies the conclusion of p: i.e., (-i<t>)M. (Actually, what we know is <Af, G>l=r-,<i>\ which is provably equivalent to (-,</>)M.) By (*), then, What is left is to show that <f> is TI ]-con over ZF. We will use 4.1. Let F0 be a fairly large finite chunk of ZF (how much we will need will become evident soon). Let F, be any finite subset of ZF. We want to show that ZF proves ConM(F, + <i>). Let F = F0 u F,. Then F + -iCon^F) is a theory at least as strong as F, + <j>, so it will suffice to prove ConM(F + -, Con^F)).
To do that imitate the proof of Gödel's 2nd Incompleteness Theorem. The key step is justified by the following fact:
There is a finitely axiomatizable subtheory F of ZF such that for any 2, sentence a,
